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1. Introduction 
Since the creation of EMU, the intra-euro area competitiveness of euro area member states 
has  diverged  steadily  and  significantly.  While  German  competitiveness  has  increased  as 
evidenced by rising trade surpluses in the years 2002 to 2007, other countries like Spain, Italy 
and Portugal have fallen behind due to high wage growth and low productivity increases. Up 
to  the  present,  this  divergence  of  competitiveness  seems  to  persist  and  shows  no  sign  of 
reversal  (de  Grauwe  2009c  and  Gros,  Mayer  and  Ubide  2005).  This  is  reflected  in  still 
growing intra-euro area current account imbalances and most recently in rising yields and 
CDS premiums on government bonds versus Germany. 
With the current financial and economic crisis, the diverging competitiveness in the euro 
area has moved on top of the political agendas (EC 2009). Some analysts argue that in the 
face of the crisis, flexibility presents a handicap for euro area countries and rigidities are 
virtuous (see, for instance, de Grauwe 2009a). The main argument is that rigidities in wages, 
employment and social security allow countries to better deal with the fixed levels of debt 
imposed on households and firms. Hence, we should cherish these rigidities today.  
This  paper  shows  that  this  view  does  not  correspond  with  empirical  evidence.  More 
flexibility of labour markets and a more incentive compatible welfare state remain the key for 
the  necessary  re-balancing  of  large  intra-euro  area  current  account  imbalances.  The  main 
concern  is  with  respect  to  real  exchange  rates  within  the  euro  area:  countries  with  low 
competitiveness and high current account deficits find themselves in dire need to depreciate in 
real terms against countries with strong competitiveness. The absence of nominal intra-euro 
area exchange rates implies that asymmetric shocks must have a valve elsewhere. This shifts 
the burden to relative wages and prices which presupposes that wages have to be flexible 
and/or labour force has to be mobile. However, both wage flexibility and labour mobility 
remain rather limited in the euro area.  
Up to now, research on this issue has been quite scarce. The seminal paper by Mundell 
(1961)  on  optimum  currency  areas  analyses  the  adjustment  to  asymmetric  shocks  in  a 
currency  union  in  a  Keynesian  framework,  stressing  the  crucial  role  of  flexible  labour 
markets. In the advent of the euro, the adjustment capacity of future EMU members has been 
intensively discussed and the need for flexible labour markets was stressed e.g. by Pissarides 
(1997). Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002), Blanchard (2007), and European Commission (2009) 
analyse  the  competitiveness  adjustment  process  within  the  euro  area  following  the 
introduction of the euro. According to Blanchard (2007), a key result is that without labour - 3 - 
market flexibility the process of competitiveness adjustment will cause high unemployment 
until competitiveness is restored. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the determinants 
and  the  process  of  competitiveness  adjustment  in  the  euro  area  with  respect  to  public 
structural reforms and private restructuring. Section 3 reviews the theoretical and empirical 
literature on the background of the current financial distress in the euro area. In section 4, we 
estimate  the  individual  impacts  of  private  restructuring  and  public  structural  reforms  on 
competitiveness in a dynamic panel for eleven euro area countries for the years 1991 to 2007. 
Section 5 discusses policy implications. 
 
2. Competitiveness within the euro area 
After  the  start  of  EMU  in  1999,  unexpected  intra-euro  area  current  account  imbalances 
emerged. Meanwhile, the rising gap between Germany (and some smaller countries) on the 
one hand and most other EMU members on the other has cumulated in diverging yields on 
national government bonds during the recent financial turmoil (de Grauwe 2009a,b). Because 
of rising doubts that countries with low industrial competitiveness will be able to repay high 
international  liabilities,  the  intra-area  adjustment  of  competitiveness  between  member 
countries is regarded as a crucial issue for the macroeconomic and political stability of the 
euro area (EC 2009). Either competitiveness well be adjusted or the euro area will fall apart. 
 
2.1. The competitiveness channel in the euro area 
Given  a  common  currency,  the  real  exchange  rate  depends  on  changes  in  relative  prices 
between countries. A country with low competitiveness needs a real depreciation and, hence, 
to  deflate  its  general  price  level  in  relative  terms  to  regain  competitiveness.  Domestic 
products  have  to  become  cheaper  compared  to  foreign  goods.  If  this  is  the  case,  exports 
increase,  imports  decrease  and  the  current  account  deficit  is  eliminated.  Conversely,  a 
competitive  country  could  reduce  its  export  surplus  by  real  appreciation  for  instance  by 
increasing  wages.  This  would  accelerate  national  inflation  via  higher  costs  and  prices. 
Competitiveness in the euro area would be rebalanced via flexible prices and wages. 
The  argument  that  a  monetary  union  with  heterogeneous  members  requires  flexible 
markets goes back to the literature on optimum currency areas (OCA). The seminal paper by - 4 - 
Mundell (1961) demonstrates that members of a monetary union need flexible labour markets 
to adjust to asymmetric shocks. Otherwise, membership in a common currency area is not 
beneficial for them. Sudden changes in relative prices necessitate a gradual readjustment in 
the enterprise sector to restore relative competitiveness. Note that in contrast to Mundell’s 
(1961)  case,  the  current  pressing  disequilibrium  within  EMU  has  not  emerged  suddenly 
through a shock, but gradually via persistently asymmetric wage policies. 
According to the trade theories of factor price equalisation, trade and/or labour migration 
act as transmission channels for relative wage adjustment. In the country with relative high 
prices (low competitiveness), exports will decline (trade channel). To regain competitiveness, 
wages are reduced whereas in the country with rising exports labour demand is boosted which 
encourages  wage  increases.  Additionally  or  alternatively,  labour  force  migrates  from  the 
country  in  recession  to  the  country  in  the  boom  (labour  migration  channel)
1.  Labour 
movement  will  continue  until  relative  wages  and  relative  prices  are  rebalanced.  Both 
mechanisms will only work efficiently if wages are flexible and/or labour mobility is high. 
If prices and wages are rigid, adjustment of competitiveness differences lasts longer (EC 
2008) and is costly in terms of unemployment  (Blanchard 2007).  Given downward wage 
rigidity, lower labour demand will cause unemployment. In contrast, the highly competitive 
country will face labour shortage. In the long run, as unemployment increases, the pressure 
for adjustment in the less competitive country increases. Blanchard (2007: 7) calls this way of 
adjustment  competitive  disinflation,  representing  “[…]  a  period  of  sustained  high 
unemployment, leading to lower nominal wage growth until relative unit labour costs have 
decreased, [and] competitiveness has improved”. The speed of this adjustment process and 
the  level  of  unemployment  depend  on  the  degree  of  wage  rigidity.  Such  a  period  of 
competitiveness disinflation can be argued to have take place in Germany, where real wages 
remained widely constant since the turn of the millennium after unemployment had increased 
to historical level. 
The common monetary policy and the low inflation policy of the European Central Bank 
further narrow the scope for a competitive disinflation process. Assuming that nominal wage 
cuts are unlikely, a country with lagging competitiveness that holds nominal wages constant 
                                                 
1 This is the main mechanism through which U.S. states adjust to unemployment (Blanchard 2006). In this 
context, Wasmer (2003) argues that higher labour mobility results from high labour market flexibility. US labour 
force faces low employment protection and invests therefore more in person specific human capital, which 
enables them to be mobile. In contrast, European workers tend to invest in firm specific human capital, which 
makes them less mobile.  - 5 - 
can only gain real wage cuts by size of inflation. The lower inflation is, the smaller will be 
real  wage  cuts  and  competitiveness  gains  against  other  euro  area  countries
2,  and  the 
rebalancing process is postponed. 
All  in  all,  given  similar  levels  of  productivity  increases,  downward  wage  flexibility  is 
crucial for balancing competitiveness in the euro area. This is even more the case as the 
common currency has reduced transaction costs for intra-euro area trade and has enhanced 
price  transparency  across  borders  (EC  2008,  Badinger  2007).  Moreover,  the  process  of 
globalisation, i.e. rising competition from China and CEE, has further enhanced the pressure 
on competitive as well as less competitive euro area countries.     
 
2.2. Prices, wages and productivity in the euro area 
Despite  a  common  monetary  policy,  structural  differences  in  wage  growth  and  inflation 
between members of the euro area have persisted and have even increased in the euro area for 
several reasons. First, there are differences in inflation traditions and inflation expectations. 
The  ECB’s  low  inflation  target  seems  to  be  anchored  differently  in  anticipated  national 
inflation rates, which is reflected in divergent long-run expected inflation in different parts of 
the euro area (Hofmann/Remsperger 2005). Although inflation differences are lower than in 
the past, wages and prices continued to rise in many Southern European countries despite a 
tighter  monetary  policy  stance  in  the  EMU  centre.  In  this  context,  structural  inflation 
differences can be seen as the outcome of price level convergence in the euro area, as some 
EMU  members  such  as  Greece,  Portugal  and  Slovenia  continued  to  catch-up  in  terms  of 
productivity, the well-known Balassa-Samuelson effect.  
Second, differences in consumption and production structures across countries have an 
impact on national inflation. As countries are differently exposed to extra euro area trade, 
changes in the external value of the euro have a country-specific impact on imported inflation 
(Honohan/Lane 2003, Hofmann/Remsperger 2005). For example, since Ireland trades more 
with the UK than with Germany, a depreciation of the euro against the pound increases import 
prices in Ireland more than in Germany. Furthermore, countries are unequally exposed to 
temporary shocks, such as the surge of raw material and oil prices due to different crude oil 
dependency (Hofmann/Remsperger 2005, EC 2006). More technology intensive economies 
                                                 
2 Here we simply assume no real wage cuts in competitor countries. - 6 - 
such  as  Germany  use  relatively  less  oil  per  unit  GDP  than  Southern European  countries, 
which therefore have been hit stronger to increasing raw material prices.  
Third,  structural  differences  among  national  euro  area  inflation  rates  can  be  driven  by 
idiosyncratic business cycles (Honohan/Lane 2003, EC 2006). For instance, after the turn of 
the millennium Spain and Ireland experienced a period of sustained growth while German 
growth remained sluggish. Thereby, the implementation of the common monetary policy and 
its resulting country specific real interest rate shocks contributed to asymmetric economic 
developments  (EC  2008).  Falling  interest  rates  and  persistent  inflation  rates  reduced  real 
interest  and  boosted  demand  in  former  high  inflation  countries  such  as  Spain  or  Ireland 
(López-Salida et al 2005). In contrast, relatively high real interest rates in Germany reduced 
investment demand and kept inflation low. 
Fourth  and  probably  most  important,  national  inflation  rates  were  driven  by  different 
degrees of national wage and productivity growth. In Germany, high unemployment, partly a 
legacy of its unification, kept real wage growth low. Beyond EMU, German wage austerity 
since the mid 1990s can be seen as  response to low wage competition from Central  and 
Eastern Europe and East Asia. In addition, German productivity increased. In contrast, wage 
growth  in  Spain,  Italy,  Portugal  and  Greece  remained  high,  for  instance  due  to  inflation 
indexation in Spain (López-Salida et al 2005) and/or buoyant capital inflows. Productivity 
growth  remained  moderate.  Furthermore,  structural  reforms  in  labour  markets  were 
implemented in different speeds and scopes (de Grauwe 2009c) affecting the country-specific 
inflation dynamics (Beck at al 2009).  
Figure 1 displays the development of unit labour costs in the euro area from 1999 to 2007. 
While  Germany  and  Austria  almost  kept  the  level  of  1999,  in  Ireland,  Portugal,  Spain, 
Greece,  Italy,  and  Netherlands  unit  labour  costs  have  increased  significantly  up  to  30% 
compared  to  1999.  This  implies  a  real  appreciation/depreciation,  a  loss/gain  in 
competitiveness, and the build-up of intra-euro area current account imbalances. Note that 
these imbalances are driven by the private sector (trade unions and enterprises) rather than by 
the harmonized common macroeconomic policies.    
Figure 2 shows the close interrelation between unit labour costs and national inflation. The 
x-axis shows cumulative nominal unit labour cost growth since 1999, the y-axis displays the 
cumulated inflation during the same period. Countries with low unit labour cost growth over 
the  last  years  such  as  Germany  and  Austria  are  also  among  the  country  group  with  low - 7 - 
inflation. In contrast, Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal have seen high unit labour cost 
growth  and  high  country-specific  inflation.  The  dashed  regression  line  indicates  a  strong 
correlation between unit labour cost growth and inflation.   



































Source: European Commission, AMECO. 
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Source: European Commission, AMECO. - 8 - 
The steadily rising intra-euro area imbalances imply that there is neither wage competition 
nor wage harmonization within the euro area. Apparently, relative wages have apparently not 
been  adjusted  to  diverging  competitiveness  and  have  failed  to  correct  rising  imbalances. 
Altissimo,  Ehrmann  and  Smets  (2006)  argue  that  structural  rigidities  and  in  particular 
downward  rigid  prices  and  wages  in  the  euro  area  have  prevented  an  adjustment  of  real 
exchange rates. In this context, the European Commission (2006) shows that country specific 
unit labour costs respond differently to positive and negative output gaps. In Portugal, Italy, 
Greece, France and Finland competitiveness is lost relatively more compared to Germany and 
Austria during an economic downturn. Generally, this pattern is attributed to different degrees 
of nominal wage rigidity.  
 
2.3. Non-price competitiveness 
Besides unit labour cost divergences, which are here referred to as price competitiveness, also 
non-price competitiveness can explain intra-euro area imbalances. Amable and Verspagen 
(1995) and  Ilzkovitz et al (2008) emphasise the role of non-price competitiveness, which 
covers a large set of variables such as sectoral and geographical specialization of the export 
sector, production and technology structure, and the quality of products.  
First, a clear pattern of specialization in specific goods and export markets is important for 
competitiveness.  A  country  with  (without)  a  sectoral  specialization  in  difficult-to-imitate 
goods has an advantage (disadvantage) which allows (does not allow) higher relative wage 
growth (Ilzkovitz et al 2008). Additionally, the geographical specialization, i.e. the structure 
of a country’s main export destinations, matters. Export specialization to dynamic (emerging) 
markets will boost overall exports relative to exports to mature markets.  
Second, the production structure determines how and to what extent rising wage costs can 
be passed on to international markets. If a country is specialized in the production of labour 
intensive  goods,  the  power  to  pass  prices  to  international  markets  will  be  low  and 
international market shares are lost in response to higher wages. This is because rising wages 
are translated to a larger extent into rising production costs as wage costs account for a larger 
share of overall costs. Hence, wage growth in countries with labour-intensive production such 
as Italy, Greece, or Portugal accelerated the loss of competitiveness relative to countries with 
capital-intensive production such as Germany. This effect is in particular strong in the euro - 9 - 
area, where a common monetary policy and integrated capital markets provide almost equal 
capital costs (ECB 2008). 
As  shown  in  Figure  3,  capital  intensity  in  the  euro  area  differs  significantly  between 
Germany,  Austria  and  France  at  the  top  and  Greece,  Spain  and  Portugal  at  the  bottom. 
Notably,  the  capital  per  worker  ratio  in  Portugal  is  almost  one  third  of  the  German  one. 
Labour  productivity  of  bottom  group  countries  is  much  lower  than  in  capital-intensive 
countries. Theoretically, low productivity growth needs to be compensated by lower wage 
increases. Squares mark countries with high relative unit labour cost growth since 1999. They 
indicate that relative wage growth was not accompanied by relative labour productivity gains 
in Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal. Productivity growth in Ireland is likely to have been 
influenced by the fast growth of the financial sector and therefore can be expected to be 
corrected in the years to come. 
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Source: European Commission, AMECO. Squares mark Countries with relative high ULC Growth since 1999. 
 
Third,  the  nature  of  competition  and  the  heterogeneity  of  goods  matter.  Non-price 
competition  based  on  diversified  goods  and  quality  allows  higher  prices  in  international 
markets as customers are willing to offer an extra pay for special characteristics of goods - 10 - 
(Aiginger  2000).  In  this  case,  firms  are  able  to  shift  higher  wage  costs  to  international 
customers. Such kind of quality competition dominates in high technology and high skill 
industries  (Aiginger  2000).  In  contrast,  low  technology  and  low  skill  (labour-intensive) 
industries mostly compete by prices. In the latter case wage growth is more harmful because 
competition with low labour cost  countries, such as the new EU members or East  Asian 
emerging markets is fiercer. With rigid labour markets, unemployment tends to rise, and to 
become structural and long lasting. In the euro area, Portugal, Spain, Greece, and to some 
extent  Italy  rely  mainly  on  low-tech  and  medium-tech  exports  (ECB  2005,  Baumann/di 
Mauro 2007). They have suffered from price competition from new EU member countries and 
East Asia (Bennett/Zarnic 2008). Current account deficits have gradually increased.  
 
2.4. The role of the non-tradable sector 
Although the divergences in euro area competitiveness have become visible in the tradable 
sector, there is a need for adjustment in the non-tradable sector for two reasons. First, non-
tradable  goods  (i.e.  services)  such  as  logistics,  IT,  construction,  personnel  and  financial 
services are used as inputs for the production of tradable goods. Rising prices in the non-
tradable sector push up the costs in the tradable sector. Second, price increases in the non-
tradable sector fuel rising inflation (López-Salida et al 2005) which reduces the purchasing 
power of wages in the tradable sector. Trade unions in the tradable sector claim inflation 
compensation in the wage bargaining process. By these second-round effects the production 
costs of tradable goods increase and competitiveness is eroded. This corresponds to a kind of 
reversed  Balassa-Samuelson  setting  where  rising  wages  in  the  non-tradable  sector  trigger 
wage adjustment in the traded goods sector, which erodes competitiveness in international 
markets. 
Figure 4 supports this view and provides evidence that the non-tradable sector contributed 
significantly  to  competitiveness  divergence  in  Europe.  It  displays  cumulative  growth  of 
sectoral unit wage costs
4 in percent from 1999 to 2007 for eleven core euro area countries 
subdivided by sector. While industry and manufacturing are classified as tradable sectors, 
services and construction are defined as non-tradables. The black dot indicates the cumulative 
nominal  labour  cost  growth  within  the  period.  In  countries  whose  competitiveness  has 
                                                                                                                                                          
3 High labour productivity  and capital intensity in Ireland is due to the financial sector, which will probably 
shrink during the current financial crisis. 
4 Unit wage costs as defined by the European Commission are equivalent to the compensation of employees in 
sector i divided by gross value added of sector i. - 11 - 
deteriorated since 1999, as measured by high overall unit labour cost growth, unit wage cost 
growth in services and construction exceeded that in industry and manufacturing by far. In 
contrast, in Germany and Austria unit wage costs in the service and construction sectors have 
increased only moderately which contributed to low overall unit labour cost growth as argued 
by the European Commission (2006).  
 
Figure 4 - Nominal unit wage costs by major sectors and overall unit labour costs, cumulative 
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Source: European Commission, AMECO. 
 
3. Structural reforms, market forces, and competitiveness adjustment 
The pivotal role of labour markets for a reduction of intra-euro area imbalances raises the 
question  of  how  more  labour  market  flexibility  can  be  achieved.  We  first  analyse  how 
national  governments  can  enhance  labour  market  flexibility  by  public  structural  reforms. 
Then, we investigate potential responses of the private sector to deteriorating competitiveness. 
   
3.1. Public structural reforms 
Public structural reforms play an important role in restoring competitiveness and in reducing 
intra-euro  area  imbalances.  They  increase  labour  market  flexibility  by  improving  labour - 12 - 
market institutions. In particular, the adequate choice of labour market institutions is crucial 
for a good labour market performance because it affects the reservation wage
5 and the wage 
bargaining power of employees (Arpaia/Mourree 2005, Nickell/Layard 1993). High labour 
market  flexibility  increases  the  responsibility  of  the  labour  market  to  the  current  account 
balance.  
A radical straightforward reform strategy is to relax employment protection and to reduce 
unemployment  benefits.  First,  less  employment  protection  increases  employers'  flexibility 
when responding to changes in demand via lay-offs. This reduces workers’ bargaining power 
and facilitates wage cuts in the face of recession. Either employment or wages or even both of 
them will be more volatile over the business cycle (Bentolila/Bertola 1990, EC 2006). In 
particular, in a monetary union lower employment protection necessitates wage flexibility 
because  monetary  policy  can  not  address  idiosyncratic  shocks.  The  adjustment  speed 
increases and unemployment is reduced. Second, lower unemployment benefits increase the 
incentive  of  unemployed  labour  force  to  accept  jobs  at  a  lower  wage  because  both  the 
reservation wage i.e. as the implicit minimum wage is reduced. This in turn enhances price 
competitiveness for labour-intensive and low technology production as unit labour costs fall. 
Nevertheless,  reducing  labour  protection  may  not  be  the  first-best  solution  to  restore 
competitiveness.  The  European  Commission  (EC  2006)  argues  that  given  more  flexible 
labour  markets,  volatility  of  unemployment  rises  with  indeterminate  effects  on  structural 
unemployment over the business cycle. Yet, structural reforms should assure an adjustment of 
competitiveness by holding unemployment low. In this context, Acemoglu and Shimer (2000) 
show that risk averse workers tend to accept lower wages in return for a higher employment 
probability which encourages enterprises to create low wage and low productivity jobs. Both, 
structural unemployment and overall productivity decline (see also Arapaia/Mourre 2005). In 
contrast,  more  generous  unemployment  benefits  can  influence  productivity  positively  by 
creating more capital-intensive jobs (Acemoglu 2001).  
To  address  these  caveats,  structural  reforms  could  be  supported  by  productivity 
improvement,  for  instance  by  active  labour  market  policies  such  as  better  education  and 
training  to  arrive  at  a  skilled  labour  force.  Unemployed  labour  could  be  retrained  for  a 
changed labour market demand. This argument corresponds with the European Commission's 
flexicurity approach which asks member states to improve labour market flexibility (wages 
                                                 
5 As defined as the lowest wage at which workers accept a particular type of job. - 13 - 
and mobility), to balance employment protection and security in the labour market, as well as 
active labour market policy (EC 2007).  
Beyond  labour  markets,  product  market  deregulation  increases  the  competitiveness 
adjustment  pressure  as  the  responsiveness  of  prices  and  wages  to  changes  in  the  market 
environment increases (Bayoumi/Laxton/Pesenti 2004). The European single market program 
has already increased competition by streamlining the regulations in the EU tradable sector 
and  dismantling  trade  barriers  such  as  tariffs  and  exchange  rate  fluctuations.  However, 
competition in the non-tradable sector is still limited (EC 2007) and national price levels have 
tended to diverge rather than to converge (Deutsche Bundesbank 2009).  
Despite the need for structural reforms, they tend to be delayed by political reform costs 
and/or  a  relaxed  budget  constraint.  Political  reform  costs  are  arising  for  instance  from 
opposition  by  insiders  and/or  outsiders  (Saint-Paul  2004,  Alesina/Ardagna/Trebbi  2006). 
Employed labour force opposes labour market reforms as rents in form of a high reservation 
wage are lost. The government faces protests and strikes as most prominently experienced in 
France.  In  this  context,  as  politicians  are  concerned  about  their  re-election,  the  time 
asymmetry  of  reform  costs  and  benefits  matters.  Costs  of  reforms  (in  terms  of  voters’ 
discontent) arise immediately but benefits are reaped in the future, possibly after elections 
(Conesa/Garriga 2003).  
The  upshot  is  that  politicians  tend  to  postpone  reforms  and  try  to  fight  rising 
unemployment  resulting  from  low  competitiveness  by  fiscal  expansion.  The  opposition 
against additional government debt is less as costs imposed by higher taxes or higher inflation 
are  postponed  after  elections.  This  ability  to  postpone  reforms  via  higher  government 
expenditure is lower in times of economic downturns when the resources for fiscal expansion 
are depleted (Drazen/Grilli 1993). Then political groups will more easily accept reforms as 
costs of non-reforming are more evident and room for fiscal expansion is small. Additionally, 
the common currency in the euro area disables the escape route of monetary expansion and 
devaluation to increase competitiveness temporarily (Belke/Herz/Vogel 2006, Bertola 2008). 
Governments  are  forced  to  reform  which  refers  to  the  “there  is  no  alternative”  (TINA) 
argument.  In  contrast,  bail-outs  of  single  EMU  members  and  outright  government  bond 
purchases by the ECB would be equivalent of postponing national reform efforts. 
 
 
 - 14 - 
3.2. Private sector adjustment 
In  contrast  to  the  government,  the  private  sector  generally  tends  to  adjust  earlier  to 
deteriorated  international  competitiveness  because  of  its  tighter  budget  constraint.  As 
declining  competitiveness  translates  into  lower  or  negative  profit  margins,  pressure  by 
shareholders and capital lenders forces private enterprises to restructure. Usually, the main 
pillar of such private adjustment will be to cut unit labour costs, which may incorporate a 
larger capital stock, better technology, less employment and/or lower wages. With flexible 
labour markets, wage costs can easily be adjusted within the wage bargaining process. In 
contrast, inflexible labour markets force private enterprises to lay off workers. Both cases 
increase competitiveness and the current account is balanced. 
There are several ways of restructuring. First, the private sector can increase productivity 
by substituting capital for labour. Wage costs per unit output, i.e. unit labour costs, decline but 
unemployment tends to increase. Figure 5 shows the difference in the degree of substitution 
of labour by capital, henceforth called labour-capital substitution, between Germany and Italy 
as well as the real exchange rate and the bilateral trade balance between both countries since 
1992.  As  shown  by  the  downward-sloped  smoothed  bold  line,  Germany  substituted  more 
capital for labour than Italy. This gap was especially large in the 1990s.  
Germany suffered from a strong real appreciation of the Deutschmark in the late 1980s and 
during its unification boom which deteriorated German competitiveness and trade balance. A 
faster speed of labour-capital substitution helped to restore competitiveness of the German 
economy, as indicated by the real depreciation and the improved trade account. After the 
introduction of the euro in 1999, relative labour-capital substitution continued which can be 
interpreted as the response to an overvalued entry of the mark into the monetary union (EC 
2008). The rise of German competitiveness continued until the financial crisis started in mid-
2007 and even accelerated in 2008, when substantial competitiveness gaps within the euro 
area became apparent by rising spreads on euro area countries’ government bonds.  
Second,  unit  labour  costs  can  be  cut  by  international  outsourcing  of  labour-intensive 
production  via  FDI  (off-shoring)
6  and/or  importing  labour-intensive  intermediates  (Farrell 
2004). For instance, Daveri and Jona-Lasinio (2008) estimate that off-shoring of intermediate 
good  production  contributed  significantly  to  overall  productivity  growth  in  Italy.  For 
Germany,  Sinn  (2004)  coined  the  concept  of  a  Bazaar  economy,  arguing  that  German - 15 - 
manufacturers  have  extensively  made  use  of  off-shoring  and  imports  of  intermediates  to 
improve  competitiveness,  leading  to  unprecedented  trade  surpluses.  Hence,  the  share  of 
imported intermediate goods rose to over 50 percent of export values in 2007 (Sinn 2007). 
Companies have increased their competitiveness by reducing firm unit labour cost at the cost 
of domestic manufacturing employment (Farrell 2004, Sinn 2007).  
Summarizing, both private market adjustment and structural reforms have the potential to 
increase competitiveness and to reduce intra-euro area imbalances via more flexible labour 
markets.  Unit  labour  cost  moderation  at  the  firm  level  is  the  main  driving  force  of  the 
adjustment process. Both structural reforms and private market adjustment should lead to a 
rather similar outcome with respect to current account balances, but impose different costs in 
terms of political reform costs or unemployment. However, structural reforms influence the 
degree of labour market flexibility and therefore determine how competitiveness will adjust 
by  setting  the  "rules  of  adjustment".  Flexible  labour  markets  allow  direct  relative  wage 
adjustment. In contrast, rigid labour markets force the private sector to adjust via labour-
capital substitution and/or off-shoring. 
 
Figure 5 - Labour-capital substitution and the real exchange rate



















































































































































Labour-Capital-Substitution, Difference Germany-Italy HP-filtered (l.h.s.)
German Trade Account against Italy, in Percent of German GDP (l.h.s.)
Real Exchange Rate Italy/Germany based on ULC (r.h.s.)
 
Source: European Commission, AMECO and own calculation based on IMF, IFS and OECD, EO. 
                                                                                                                                                          
6 According to IMF (2007: 164), off-shoring or offshore outsourcing is defined by the movement of parts of 
production to less costly foreign locations. 
7 As a real exchange rate variable we use a rate based on unit labour costs, which is highly correlated with a CPI 
based real exchange rate variable. In Figure 6, an appreciation corresponds to an increase of the index.   - 16 - 
4. Empirical analysis 
Taking our analysis in sections 2 and 3 as a starting point, we test the impact of private 
market  adjustment  and  structural  reforms  on  competitiveness  of  the  euro  area  member 
countries  in  a  coherent  econometric  panel  framework.  We  also  assess  the  empirical 
significance of potential interdependences (complementarity vs. substitutability) between both 
types of efforts. 
 
4.1. Hypotheses  
In this context, we test the following hypotheses: 
1.  Structural reforms and private market adjustment foster international competitiveness. 
This  hypothesis  tests  the  impact  of  both  efforts  in  promoting  competitiveness  as 
described in section 3.1 and 3.2. 
2.  Structural  reforms  modify  the  characteristics  of  the  competitiveness  adjustment 
process. Here we test whether there are interdependencies/substitution effects between 
public structural reforms and private market adjustment. 
3.  The  effectiveness  of  structural  reforms  and  private  market  adjustment  has  been 
affected by the European Monetary Union. Here, we take the OCA literature as a 
starting point suggesting that EMU has reinforced the need for structural reforms.  
 
4.2. Data and variables  
We  estimate  the  impact  of  private  market  adjustment  and  structural  reforms  on 
competitiveness in the euro area based on a dynamic panel of bilateral yearly differences of 
eleven euro area countries.
8 The sample period covers the period from 1991 to 2007. Since we 
work with annual data, we arrive at a maximum number of 1870 observations. Due to missing 
data,  actual  observations  are  a  little  less.  As  international  competitiveness  of  countries  is 
defined as a measure of one country relative to another country, we will use relative variables, 
for  instance  Italian  competitiveness  against  Germany  or  Spain,  throughout  the  empirical 
analysis.  
 
                                                 
8 Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain. - 17 - 
Indicators of international competitiveness 
The OECD defines international competitiveness as “…a measure of a country's advantage 
or disadvantage in selling its products in international markets” (OECD 2008). This wide 
definition includes many variables that affect the macroeconomic performance of a country 
(Durand/Simon/Webb  1992).  These  variables  include  a  wide  variety  of  competitiveness 
measures such as real exchange rates, unit labour costs and competitiveness indices.  
As our research focuses on intra-euro area current account imbalances, we use bilateral 
trade  account  balances  (TAB),  in  percent  of  national  GDP,  to  measure  “realized” 
competitiveness.  An  advantage  is  that  trade  data  also  display  the  technical  and  quality 
competitiveness of a country’s export sector. Similarly, they implicitly mirror competitiveness 
of  the  domestic  sector  whereas  changing  consumption  patterns  are  not  controlled  for.  As 
usual, structural reforms are assumed to promote exports and/or to decrease imports as the 
domestic competitiveness rises. Due to a lack of data, we cannot include trade in services or 
bilateral current account balances. We control for business cycle effects and nominal price 
effects by adding private consumption and export price inflation. 
 
Structural reforms 
The measurement of structural reforms is not easy and its discussion fills many pages. Earlier 
empirical papers on structural reforms (Belke/Herz/Vogel 2006) use the Economic Freedom 
of  the  World  Index  as  indicators  for  structural  reforms.  The  index  measures  economic 
freedom cardinally. An advantage of this index is the disaggregation in different policy areas. 
However,  data  are  only  available  in  five  year  frequencies  before  the  year  2000  and  the 
variations over time as  well as between countries are small. Duval and Elmeskov (2006) 
calculate a binary reform index based on an OECD Databank on structural reforms. This 
method mirrors explicit structural reforms but it does not account for the scope of a reform. 
Due  to  these  shortcomings  of  indices  on  structural  reforms,  we  use  the  following 
macroeconomic  indicators  as  proxy  for  public  structural  reforms  and  assume  that  these 
macroeconomic indicators display the performance of accumulated previous public structural 
reforms.  
First,  we  use  structural  unemployment  measured  by  non-accelerating  wage  rate  of 
unemployment (NAWRU) which is the unemployment rate consistent with constant wage 
inflation and which indicates structural imbalances in labour markets. However, calculations - 18 - 
on structural unemployment are dependent on the estimation concept used. We include both 
calculations  from  the  OECD  and  the  European  Commission  to  check  for  robustness.  We 
assume  that  declining  structural  unemployment  is  due  to  (past)  structural  labour  market 
reforms.  
Second,  social  benefits  (SB)  in  percent  of  GDP  are  used  as  proxy  for  cumulated  past 
structural reforms concerning the welfare system, especially unemployment compensation. 
Large social benefits are associated with moral hazard and inefficient allocation of public 
transfers. Additionally, social benefits can act as implicit minimum wage. A reduction of 
social  benefits  increases  the  pressure  for  wage  moderation  by  boosting  the  incentive  of 
unemployed to accept job offers at lower wages. Both, lower structural unemployment and 
lower  social  benefits  are  assumed  to  be  correlated  with  an  increase  in  international 
competitiveness.  
To enhance the readability of our estimation results we multiply both proxies with (-1). 
Then higher realisations of (-1)*NAWRU or (-1)*SB are now equivalent to more structural 
reforms. We expect both proxies to be positively correlated with bilateral trade balances.  
 
Private restructuring 
To  measure  private  restructuring  we  use  six  different  proxies.  First,  private  market 
adjustment,  such  as  increasing  productivity  or  wage  moderation,  target  unit  labour  costs, 
which are therefore seen as an important determinant of competitiveness. Hence, we apply 
changes in unit labour costs (ULC) as a proxy of private restructuring of the enterprise sector. 
Second, we use the nominal compensation rate (NCR) which measures wage costs including 
fringe benefits
9. Again, both indicators are multiplied by (-1). Third, we test for the impact of 
productivity (PROD) and, fourth, the degree of labour-capital-substitution (LABCAP) on the 
trade account. These latter both variables are not multiplied by (-1).  
It is difficult to find a proxy for off-shoring. Off-shoring is mostly measured on a highly 
disaggregated level. For example, IMF (2007) and Daveri and Jona-Lasinio (2008) use input-
output data for their analyses; Goerg, Hanley and Strobl (2008) base their empirical analysis 
on plant level data. Both data sets do not fit for our analysis since data are not available for all 
                                                 
9  Compensation includes employer’s contribution to statutory social security schemes or to private funded social 
insurance schemes and unfunded employee social benefits paid by employers in the form  (such as children's, 
spouse's or payments made to workers because of illness, accidental injury). 
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countries during the observation period. Therefore, we use as fifth variable outward FDI in 
percent of GDP as a proxy of off-shoring, based on the assumption that off-shoring as proxy 
for private restructuring is associated with increasing outward FDI. This approach excludes 
off-shoring  that  is  not  linked  to  FDI  such  as  outsourcing  of  services  to  firms  abroad  or 
increasing imports of intermediate products.  
Sixth, we measure technological competitiveness by making use of the Balassa index of 
Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) (Balassa 1965), which accounts for a relative export 
share in an industry  compared to all countries.
10 We calculate the RCA indicator  for ten 
industries of each country and aggregate over industries by classifying all industries according 
to  the  kind  of  technology  used.  Thereby,  we  multiply  the  RCA  variable  by  1  for  higher 
technology industries and by -1 in case of lower technology industries.
11 The differentiation in 
“higher technology (high and medium-high technology)” and “lower technology (low and 
medium-low technology)” follows Baumann and di Mauro (2007: 23). Our final ranking of 
countries  with  respect  to  the  industrial  specialisation  is  quite  similar  to  that  gained  by 
Baumann and di Mauro (2007).  
 
Control variables 
To control for business cycle effects in bilateral trade data we use private consumption. As 
nominal trade account data are also influenced by nominal prices, we control for relative price 
developments by relative export price inflation. A dummy variable accounts for a possible 
structural break at the start of EMU. The dummy is set equal to one for all years in which a 
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4.3. Empirical model 
To  analyse  the  impact  of  structural  reforms  and  market  adjustment  on  international 
competitiveness, we use three regression specifications. First, we test for our first hypothesis 
that structural reforms and private market adjustment affect international competitiveness by 
the following equation: 
(2)  t k, k t k, d t k, X t k, G t k, P 1 t k, 2 1 t k, 1 0 t k,   ε d β X β G β P β L β C β β C + + + + + + + + = - -  

























C . The indices  i and  j  identify countries,  t denotes time, and  k  
is the cross-section index.  t k P ,  represents the vector of proxies for private market adjustment, 
t k G ,  stands for a vector of proxies for structural reforms, and  t k X ,  captures a set of control 
variables. Additionally, we include the one-period lagged dependent variable for a dynamic 
model setting as well as the level of the trade account balance (L) lagged by one period to 
account  for  initial  problem  pressure.  We  expect  that  the  higher  a  trade  deficit  is,  which 
indicate low competitiveness, the higher will be the probability of public structural reforms or 
private restructuring as the need for adjustment is especially necessary. The vectors  t k P , ,  t k G ,  
and  t k P ,  are expressed as bilateral relative differences between country i and  j , with: 
(3a)  ( ) t j t i t k P P P , , , D - D =  
(3b)  ( ) t j t i t k G G G , , , D - D =  
(3c)  ( ) t j t i t k X X X , , , D - D = . 
This variable transformation generates stationary time series to avoid spurious regression. 
Panel  unit-root  tests  (Levin/Lin/Chu  2002,  Im/Pesaran/Shin  2003)  for  the  transformed 
variables reject non-stationary nature of all independent variables. The dummy variable  d  
controls  for  the  impact  of  EMU  on  competitiveness.  We  account  for  unobserved 
heterogeneity using cross-section fixed effects  k e .  t k, m  is the white noise error term.  
Hypothesis  one  is  corroborated  if  the  coefficient  G b   of  public  structural  reforms,  (-1) 
NAWRU and (-1) SB, reveals a positive sign. This would indicate that structural reforms in a 
                                                                                                                                                          
11 Industry 9 (Commodities and Transactions, n.e.s.) is multiplied by 0 as it cannot be explicitly classified as a - 21 - 
country tend to enhance international competitiveness as measured by bilateral trade balances. 
The estimated coefficients of private market adjustment,  P b , are expected to have a positive 
sign, too. 
We  test  our  second  hypothesis  that  structural  reforms  influence  the  private  adjustment 
process by scrutinizing the interrelations between market adjustment and structural reforms 
via adding an interaction term  t k t k G P , , . This yields:  
(4)     t k, k t k, d t k, X t k, G t k, P 1 t k, 2 1 t k, 1 0 t k,   ε d β X β G β P β L β C β β C + + + + + + + + + = - - k,t k,t A G P β  
Thereby we test, whether the relationship between the dependent variable  t k C ,  and the 
independent variable  t k P ,  is influenced by the third independent variable  t k G,  (Jaccard/Turrisi 
2003). Such interaction effects can be isolated by product terms of the independent variable 
t k P ,  (focal variable) and the second independent variable  t k G ,  (moderator variable). Note, that 
the interpretation of regression coefficients changes. With an eye on our own estimations, the 
interpretation of regression coefficients can be summarized as follows (Jaccard/Turrisi 2003): 
P b  captures the effect of  t k P ,  on  t k C ,  when  0 , = t k G ,  G b  estimates the effect of  t k G,  on  t k C ,  
when  0 , = t k P , and  A b  indicates the number of units that  P b  increases/decreases if  t k G ,  
grows by one unit.  
Generally, we cannot reject the hypothesis that public structural reforms affect the private 
adjustment  process  if  A b   becomes  statistical  significant.  If  the  estimated  coefficient  of 
interaction between structural reforms and private restructuring  A b  has (not) the same sign as 
the  estimated  coefficient  of  private  restructuring  P b ,  then  it  indicates  a  complementary 
(substitutive) relationship between public structural reforms and private restructuring.  
We test our third hypothesis that the effectiveness of structural reforms and private market 
adjustment  to  balance  competitiveness  has  been  affected  by  membership  in  the  European 
Monetary  Union  by  adding  an  interaction  term  t k t k d P , ,   which  interlinks  private  market 
adjustment and the EMU dummy variable. Alternatively, we use an interaction term  t k t k d G , ,  
measuring the impact of EMU on public structural reforms. The regression equations are: 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
lower or higher technology branch.  - 22 - 
(5a)    t k, k t k, d t k, X 1 t k, G t k, P 1 t k, 2 1 t k, 1 0 t k,   ε d β X β G β P β L β C β β C + + + + + + + + + = - - k,t k,t A d P β  
(5b)    t k, k t k, d t k, X 2 t k, G t k, P 1 t k, 2 1 t k, 1 0 t k,   ε d β X β G β P β L β C β β C + + + + + + + + + = - - k,t k,t A d G β  
Based on these specifications, we estimate the effect of EMU membership on the impact of 
private market adjustment and public structural reforms on competitiveness.  Positive signs of 
the  estimated  coefficients  1 A b   and  2 A b   indicate  a  rising  importance  of  private  market 
adjustment or of structural reforms since the start of the European Monetary Union.   
We estimate the three specifications (2), (4) and (5) based on a dynamic panel model by 
means of a System-GMM estimator (Arellano/Bover 1995, Blundell/Bond 1998) to account 
for  possible  endogenous  variables,  fixed  effects  and  heteroskedasticity.  In  contrast  to  the 
Difference-GMM (Arellano/Bond 1991), the System-GMM addresses poor performance of 
first-differenced-variable instruments. Our data set fits the requirement of a relatively small 
time dimension (max. 17 points in time) and many cross sections (110 country pairs). We 
hold the number of instruments at a minimum to enhance the discriminating power of post-
estimation over-identification tests. All variables are assumed endogenous except the EMU 
dummy, which we treat as exogenous for obvious reasons. The presented results are derived 
from robust two-step estimations, which have been corrected for potential bias of standard 
errors due to small sample size (Windmeijer 2005).  
In order to arrive at a valid model specification the null hypotheses of the Arellano-Bond 
AR(2) correlation test
12 and the Hansen over-identification test (Hansen 1982) have to be 
rejected. As we use a robust estimation, the Sargan over-identification test (Sargan 1958) 
becomes inconsistent (Roodman 2006: 12). Hence, we only report the empirical realisations 
of the Hansen test statistic. To check for the validity of our model specification, we also 
perform  specifications,  which  include  additional  time  dummies  (Roodman  2006).  That 
improves  the  autocorrelation  tests  and  the  robustness  of  standard  errors.
13  As  the  overall 
pattern of our results is untouched by this specification, only results based on specifications 
excluding deterministic time dummies are reported. 
 
                                                 
12 It is important to note that the absence of AR(2) is the necessary condition for unbiased and efficient 
estimation with GMM-SYS, but not of AR(1). First order residual autocorrelation in the starting equation is no 
problem since the estimators work with first differences. Hence, the significance of AR(1) autocorrelation does 
not limit the validity of our results. 
13 We use time dummies to make the assumption of no autocorrelation across individuals in the idiosyncratic 
disturbances more likely to hold (Roodman 2006). - 23 - 
4.4. Estimation results  
Hypothesis 1: Do structural reforms and private market adjustment foster competitiveness as 
measured by bilateral trade balances? 
Our estimation results related to hypothesis one are reported in Table  1 for the indicator 
structural unemployment and in Table 2 for the indicator social benefits. As estimation results 
for structural unemployment differ little between AMECO and OECD data, we provide only 
results for the AMECO data. Results for OECD data are shown in the Appendix. In general, 
the  coefficients  of  the  variables  measuring  the  impact  of  private  market  adjustment  on 
bilateral trade balances have the expected signs, although their levels of significance are low. 
Only the coefficients of productivity (column 3) and nominal compensation rate (column 7) 
are  significant  at  the  common  levels.  In  contrast,  the  estimated  coefficients  of  structural 
reforms  turn  out  to  be  positive  and  significant  in  almost  all  estimations.  Especially,  a 
reduction  of  structural  unemployment  relative  to  the  partner  country  is  linked  to  an 
improvement of the trade balance.  
The  estimated  coefficients  of  the  macroeconomic  control  variables  corroborate  the 
robustness of our estimation results. For instance, a relative increase in private consumption 
and relatively lower export prices reduce the bilateral trade balance. The coefficients of the 
EMU dummy are always negative and in several cases significant. This piece of evidence 
reflects  that  after  the  start  of  EMU,  bilateral  trade  balances  in  the  majority  of  countries 
declined  more  rapidly.  In  short,  this  mirrors  the  development  of  intra-euro  zone  current 
account imbalances since 1999 between Germany as a net creditor country and Spain, Italy, 
Portugal, France and Ireland as net debtor countries.  
Overall, our results widely confirm our hypothesis that in general structural reforms and 
private market adjustment tend to foster international competitiveness and increase the trade 
balance.  This  evidence  is  strong  for  structural  reforms  and  weak  for  private  market 
adjustment.  The  weak  evidence  for  private  market  adjustment  might  reflect  the  fact  that 
capital inflows (from Germany) allowed to postpone private restructuring in the majority of 
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Table 1 –Regression results: impacts of private market adjustment and structural 
unemployment (AMECO data) on competitiveness 
dependent variable:   bilateral trade balance
# 1 2 3 4 5 6
market    (-1)*nominal compensation rate 0.436
adjustment (0.309)
  (-1)*unit labour costs 0.000
(0.002)
  productivity 0.011**
(0.005)
  labour capital substitution -0.014
(0.012)
  FDI -0.001
(0.003)
  RCA -0.000
(0.001)
structural   (-1)*structural unemployment 0.037* 0.037** 0.047** 0.035*** 0.067* 0.029
reforms (AMECO data) (0.019) (0.015) (0.020) (0.014) (0.035) (0.019)
macro   trade balance -0.141* -0.189*** -0.164** -0.154** -0.187** -0.244***
variables (t-1) (0.072) (0.070) (0.081) (0.075) (0.074) (0.065)
trade balance 0.016 0.022 0.023 0.017 0.019 0.059***
(t-1) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.019) (0.017)
  private consumption -0.010*** -0.013*** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.014***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
  export prices 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.008** 0.004*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
EMU dummy -0.015 -0.023** -0.019 -0.022 -0.039* -0.007
(0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.020) (0.010)
constant 0.003 0.016* 0.007 0.010 0.026 0.009
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.016) (0.007)
model  N 1643 1720 1720 1720 1396 1502
specification instruments 26 30 30 27 28 25
AR (2) 0.962 0.627 0.801 0.869 0.217 0.403
Hansen (p-value) 0.638 0.526 0.400 0.647 0.216 0.630
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Table 2 – Regression results: impacts of private market adjustment and social benefits on 
competitiveness 
dependent variable:   bilateral trade balance
# 7 8 9 10 11 12
market    (-1)*nominal compensation rate 0.568*
adjustment (0.309)
  (-1)*unit labour costs 0.001
(0.004)
  productivity -0.001
(0.005)
  labour capital substitution -0.014
(0.013)
  FDI -0.002
(0.003)
  RCA -0.000
(0.001)
structural   (-1)*social benefits 0.012* 0.013** 0.012** 0.009 0.027** 0.003
reforms (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.013) (0.007)
macro   trade balance -0.143* -0.192*** -0.152* -0.137* -0.201*** -0.251***
variables (t-1) (0.078) (0.070) (0.079) (0.078) (0.074) (0.061)
trade balance 0.017 0.026 0.021 -0.014 0.011 0.066***
(t-1) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.023) (0.015)
  private consumption -0.008*** -0.014*** -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.014***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
  export prices 0.005*** 0.006** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.005*
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
EMU dummy -0.013 -0.018* -0.012 -0.022* -0.027** -0.003
(0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.009)
constant 0.000 0.007 0.004 0.007 0.015 0.003
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.008)
model  N 1643 1720 1720 1720 1396 1520
specification instruments 27 32 26 28 28 26
AR (2) 0.943 0.615 0.854 0.962 0.188 0.367
Hansen (p-value) 0.513 0.145 0.447 0.385 0.216 0.402
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance of 10%, 5% and 1%.    
 
Hypothesis 2: Reforms as a propagation mechanism for the adjustment of competitiveness? 
The estimation results for our hypothesis two are shown in Tables 3 and 4. The coefficients of 
the interaction term between private market adjustment and structural reforms are reported in 
the  grey  highlighted  rows.  Some  coefficients  of  the  interaction  terms  are  negative  and 
significant suggesting a substitutive relationship: Less public structural reforms require more 
private market adjustment and vice versa. An alternative interpretation is that private market 
adjustment is not as necessary if public structural reforms are conducted. For FDI we find a 
complementary relationship (column 23). Public structural reforms increase the effectiveness 
of  FDI  to  increase  competitiveness.  Notably,  coefficients  for  an  interaction  with  social 
benefits partly confirm results for structural unemployment, which underlines the robustness 
of our results. - 26 - 
The  estimation  results  indicate  that  we  cannot  reject  our  second  hypothesis.  Structural 
reforms tend to influence the competitiveness adjustment process. More specifically, we find 
mainly substitutive relationships between structural reforms and private market adjustment. 
Without structural reforms, private market adjustment such as relative wage cuts is necessary 
to improve competitiveness. According to our results, structural reforms tend to reduce this 
need.  
 
Table 3 – Regression results: impacts of private market adjustment and structural 
unemployment (AMECO data) on competitiveness including an interaction term between 
structural unemployment (AMECO data) and private market adjustment 
dependent variable:   bilateral trade balance
# 13 14 15 16 17 18
market    (-1)*nominal compensation rate 0.518*
adjustment (0.287)
  (-1)*unit labour costs 0.001
(0.002)
  productivity 0.011*
(0.006)
  labour capital substitution -0.011
(0.014)
  FDI -0.001
(0.003)
  RCA -0.001
(0.001)
structural   (-1)*structural unemployment 0.044** 0.039** 0.058*** 0.033* 0.081** 0.029
reforms (AMECO data) (0.022) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.037) (0.021)
interaction term -0.574* -0.004* 0.004 -0.030* 0.005 0.000
(market adjustment*structural reforms) (0.314) (0.002) (0.007) (0.016) (0.005) (0.001)
macro   trade balance -0.176*** -0.187*** -0.196*** -0.211*** -0.187** -0.241***
variables (t-1) (0.063) (0.067) (0.066) (0.075) (0.075) (0.066)
trade balance 0.014 0.022 0.021 0.018 0.018 0.061***
(t-1) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016)
  private consumption -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.013*** -0.014***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
  export prices 0.006** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008** 0.008** 0.004*
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
EMU dummy -0.021* -0.022** -0.024* -0.016 -0.036* -0.007
(0.012) (0.011) (0.015) (0.013) (0.019) (0.009)
constant 0.011 0.013* 0.016* 0.003 0.022 0.008
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.016) (0.008)
model  N 1643 1720 1720 1720 1396 1502
specification instruments 32 36 32 50 34 30
AR (2) 0.721 0.640 0.572 0.521 0.219 0.425
Hansen (p-value) 0.497 0.594 0.412 0.215 0.254 0.806
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance of 10%, 5% and 1%.    
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Table 4 – Regression results: impacts of private market adjustment and social benefits on 
competitiveness including an interaction term between social benefits and private market 
adjustment 
dependent variable   bilateral trade balance
# 19 20 21 22 23 24
market    (-1)*nominal compensation rate 0.632**
adjustment (0.325)
  (-1)*unit labour costs -0.001
(0.005)
  productivity -0.001)
(0.005
  labour capital substitution -0.025
(0.017)
  FDI -0.001
(0.003)
  RCA -0.000
(0.001)
structural   (-1)*social benefits 0.009 0.018** 0.011* 0.009 0.031** 0.003
reforms (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.015) (0.007)
interaction term -0.383** -0.001 -0.005 -0.008* 0.012* -0.001
(market adjustment*structural reforms) (0.194) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.001)
macro   trade balance -0.147* -0.132 -0.182** -0.132* -0.209*** -0.252***
variables (t-1) (0.080) (0.098) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.059)
trade balance 0.017 0.010 0.022 -0.009 0.012 0.065***
(t-1) (0.017) (0.033) (0.016) (0.020) (0.025) (0.015)
  private consumption -0.007** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.022*** -0.016*** -0.014***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.045) (0.004) (0.003)
  export prices 0.005*** 0.006** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.009** 0.005*
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
EMU dummy -0.009 -0.010 -0.015 -0.031** -0.020 -0.002
(0.009) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.016) (0.009)
constant 0.001 0.004 0.009 0.014 -0.000 0.002
(0.007) (0.012) (0.009) (0.015) (0.017) (0.008)
model  N 1643 1720 1720 1720 1396 1502
specification instruments 30 25 30 29 34 30
AR (2) 0.910 0.977 0.664 0.986 0.180 0.357
Hansen (p-value) 0.610 0.201 0.286 0.462 0.208 0.511
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance of 10%, 5% and 1%.    
 
Hypothesis 3: The effectiveness of structural reforms and private market adjustment has been 
affected by EMU? 
The estimation results for our third hypothesis are reported in the Tables 5 and 6. Again, the 
rows referring to the significance of interaction terms are highlighted in grey. The coefficients 
for  the  interaction  between  private  market  adjustment  and  the  EMU  dummy  are  almost 
entirely insignificant. This suggests that EMU had virtually no impact on private enterprise 
restructuring.  Only  for  the  RCA  variable  interaction  terms  (columns  36  and  48)  become 
negative  significant,  which  indicates  that  the  effectiveness  of  increasing  technology 
competitiveness  has  lowered  since  the  start  of  the  EMU.  In  contrast,  the  coefficients  for 
interaction of public structural reforms with EMU dummy are clearly negative and mostly - 28 - 
significant.  This  suggests  that  in  some  cases  since  the  start  of  EMU  the  effectiveness  of 
structural  reforms  to  improve  competitiveness  declined  in  most  euro  area  countries.  In 
contrast,  using  the  social  benefit  variable  as  a  proxy  of  structural  reforms,  the  estimated 
coefficients  of  the  interaction  terms  reveal  a  positive  sign  but  at  low  significance  levels 
yielding weak evidence that a higher effectiveness of structural reforms (relating to social 
benefits) fosters an adjustment of trade balances (column 41). Seen on the whole, however, 
evidence of either a positive or a negative impact of EMU on effectiveness of reforms in 
favour of more competitiveness is weak. Therefore, we reject hypothesis three.  - 29 - 
Table 5 – Regression results: impacts of private market adjustment and structural unemployment (AMECO data) on competitiveness including 
an interaction term between structural unemployment (AMECO data) or private market adjustment and the EMU dummy 
dependent variable:   bilateral trade balance
# 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36
market    (-1)*nominal compensation rate 0.693** 0.547*
adjustment (0.315) (0.317)
  (-1)*unit labour costs 0.005 0.005
(0.004) (0.004)
  productivity 0.010 0.005
(0.007) (0.007)
  labour capital substitution -0.002 -0.019
(0.017) (0.017)
  FDI 0.001 0.003
(0.004) (0.007)
  RCA -0.000 0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
structural   (-1)*structural unemployment 0.053** 0.067*** 0.064** 0.065** 0.065 0.042** 0.048* 0.050*** 0.048*** 0.045** 0.083** 0.030
reforms (AMECO data) (0.023) (0.026) (0.029) (0.027) (0.041) (0.020) (0.028) (0.019) (0.019) (0.023) (0.040) (0.025)
interaction term 0.349 0.000 0.009 0.038 -0.001 -0.005***
(markte adjustment*EMU dummy) (0.474) (0.005) (0.010) (0.031) (0.007) (0.002)
interaction term -0.045* -0.064** -0.071** -0.058* -0.064 -0.061**
(structural reforms*EMU dummy) (0.026) (0.030) (0.035) (0.030) (0.041) (0.025)
macro   trade balance -0.168** -0.195*** -0.181*** -0.168** -0.189*** -0.253*** -0.139* -0.189** -0.157* -0.143** -0.194*** -0.247***
variables (t-1) (0.071) (0.070) (0.070) (0.067) (0.072) (0.065) (0.078) (0.081) (0.092) (0.071) (0.072) (0.073)
trade balance 0.016 0.017 0.019 0.016 0.011 0.053*** -0.001 0.021 0.023 0.015 0.015 0.056***
(t-1) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.023) (0.018) (0.027) (0.014) (0.015) (0.012) (0.019) (0.017)
  private consumption -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.016*** 0.014*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.012*** -0.014***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
  export prices 0.005** 0.008** 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.007** 0.003 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.006 0.007**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
EMU dummy -0.021 -0.025** -0.018 -0.023* -0.028 -0.019* -0.023* -0.023* -0.017 -0.021* -0.038* -0.018
(0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.018) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.016) (0.013) (0.020) (0.011)
constant 0.006 0.016 0.010 0.014 0.022* 0.016* 0.008 0.012 0.007 0.011 0.025 0.009
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.016) (0.009)
model  N 1643 1720 1720 1720 1396 1502 1643 1720 1720 1720 1396 1502
specification instruments 34 30 40 30 29 30 27 30 38 30 36 30
AR (2) 0.790 0.605 0.693 0.764 0.194 0.353 0.966 0.660 0.863 0.954 0.207 0.410
Hansen (p-value) 0.300 0.245 0.145 0.194 0.351 0.352 0.528 0.462 0.674 0.567 0.137 0.237
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance of 10%, 5% and 1%.    - 30 - 
Table 6 - Regression results: impacts of private market adjustment and social benefits on competitiveness including an interaction term between 
social benefits or private market adjustment and the EMU dummy 
dependent variable:   bilateral trade balance
# 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48
market    (-1)*nominal compensation rate 0.388* 0.468**
adjustment (0.223) (0.238)
  (-1)*unit labour costs 0.001 0.002
(0.004) (0.004)
  productivity 0.001 -0.001
(0.006) (0.006)
  labour capital substitution -0.023 -0.019
(0.014) (0.017)
  FDI -0.000 0.010
(0.002) (0.008)
  RCA 0.001 0.003**
(0.001) (0.002)
structural   (-1)*social benefits 0.022* 0.010 0.007 0.005 0.014 0.005 0.014* 0.010 0.013* 0.009 0.013 0.008
reforms (0.011) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.015) (0.008)
interaction term -0.041 0.005 0.007 0.009 -0.10 -0.005***
(markte adjustment*EMU dummy) (0.549) (0.007) (0.008) (0.019) (0.009) (0.002)
interaction term 0.011 0.018 0.023 0.019 0.038* 0.004
(structural reforms*EMU dummy) (0.021) (0.018) (0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.020)
macro   trade balance -0.136* -0.190** -0.161* -0.135 -0.206*** -0.247*** -0.175** -0.189** -0.149 -0.101** -0.207*** -0.227***
variables (t-1) (0.078) (0.095) (0.094) (0.092) (0.074) (0.068) (0.089) (0.083) (0.092) (0.075) (0.073) (0.077)
trade balance 0.004 0.026 0.021 0.016 0.012 0.062*** 0.012 0.022 0.021 0.018 0.007 0.040**
(t-1) (0.025) (0.019) (0.013) (0.016) (0.023) (0.016) (0.032) (0.017) (0.018) (0.013) (0.023) (0.017)
  private consumption -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.013*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.010***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.030) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
  export prices 0.004* 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.004 0.003 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007 0.009** 0.008**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
EMU dummy -0.018 -0.018* -0.012 -0.020 -0.025* -0.010 -0.008 -0.021* -0.011 -0.018 -0.020 -0.017
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013)
constant 0.001 0.008 0.005 0.006 0.015 0.006 0.002 0.010 0.003 0.006 0.016 0.005
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010)
model  N 1643 1720 1720 1720 1396 1502 1643 1720 1720 1720 1396 1502
specification instruments 33 31 32 31 31 31 33 32 30 30 32 37
AR (2) 0.966 0.658 0.824 0.981 0.192 0.410 0.744 0.664 0.887 0.881 0.178 0.546
Hansen (p-value) 0.468 0.167 0.279 0.367 0.218 0.156 0.315 0.272 0.388 0.195 0.245 0.042
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance of 10%, 5% and 1%.  5. Policy implications 
This paper evaluates the competitiveness adjustment process in the euro area in the light of 
rising  intra-euro  area  current  account  imbalances,  rising  spreads  between  European 
government bonds and demands for monetary policy to cure financial and real distress. Our 
empirical estimations for euro area countries confirm a significant impact of private market 
adjustment, in particular wage adjustment, on competitiveness as measured by bilateral trade 
balances. Additionally, public structural reforms improve competitiveness, with labour market 
flexibility turning out to be a crucial determinant of competitiveness. We also find substitutive 
relationships among market adjustment and public structural reforms. There is weak evidence 
that in most EMU countries the effect of structural reforms for competitiveness adjustment 
has diminished since the since the start of EMU.  
Overall, our empirical results strongly support the potential benefits of structural reforms 
in countries with low industrial competitiveness, which have tended to abandon fiscal policy 
discipline already before the crisis. With public debt at high levels, national governments 
cannot  address  competitiveness  problems  in  the  same  way  as  they  did  in  the  past  via 
devaluations. Therefore, policy-makers were from the beginning likely to step up pressure on 
the  ECB  to  pursue  an  expansionary  monetary  policy  and  even  quantitative  easing.  This, 
however, would increase the incentive to postpone reforms and to accumulate even more 
debt. With an eye on our empirical results, we therefore join Gros, Mayer and Ubide (2005) 
and argue in contrast to De Grauwe (2009a, b) that the only way out of the dilemma is to stick 
to the reform path chosen by the stronger reformers within the euro area. 
Given the substantially different competitiveness gaps within the euro area, reforms should 
be implemented soon. The necessary adjustment process will be painful but then pass through 
to a timely economic recovery and less long-term unemployment. The alternative is a long 
period of high and painful unemployment as experienced in Germany after reunification. In 
this context, reform pressure and enacting reforms are unlikely to lead to a race to the bottom 
with respect to wage cuts, leading to a deflationary spiral. Instead, intra-euro area current 
account  imbalances  would  diminish  and  the  international  competitiveness  of  Europe  as  a 
whole would rise, as competition among wage setters and politicians is reinforced. Moreover, 
this scenario neither calls for further steps towards political union nor for a coordination or 
centralization of wage policies at a supranational level. - 32 - 
The worst scenario we can think of, however, would be that the ECB would fell forced 
very soon to engage in quantitative easing and will buy government bonds – maybe even euro 
bonds.  Even  if  the  spread  between  European  government  bonds  is  currently  likely  to  be 
exaggerated due to financial panic, the ECB should not privilege the buying of Irish, Greek, 
Spanish and  Italian  government bonds.  In doing so, it would  eliminate the incentives for 
further structural reform that these spreads create. The reason is that the denationalization of 
debt would lead to moral hazard and calls for a supranational fiscal bailout by governments 
and enterprises which have postponed reforms in the past.  
Sustaining wage rigidities in under-performing euro area countries to stimulate domestic 
demand would not prevent these countries from turning into deflation but finally would lead 
to lower domestic demand and higher current account imbalances within the euro area by 
destroying  domestic  employment.  This  is  likely  to  strengthen  economic  nationalism  and 
therefore  the  likelihood  of  a  break-up  of  the  euro  area.  Hence,  in  order  to  safeguard  the 
European  integration  process,  we  should  believe  in  markets  and  put  the  emphasis  of  our 
political efforts on shaping incentives to enact structural reforms. - 33 - 
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Annex  
 
I. Data sources 
 
Data   Source 
FDI  IMF, IFS. 
GDP  OECD,  Economic  Outlook  Database  and  IMF,  World 
Economic Outlook Database. 
INV  OECD, Economic Outlook Database. 
labour-capital substitution  European Commission, AMECO Database. 
structural unmployment 
(OECD data) 
OECD, Economic Outlook Database. 
structural unmployment 
(AMECO data) 
European Commission, AMECO Database. 
nominal compensation rate  OECD, Economic Outlook Database. 
private consumption  OECD, Economic Outlook Database. 
productivity  OECD, Economic Outlook Database. 
social benefits  OECD, Economic Outlook Database. 
bilateral trade balances, trade 
data for RCA 
OECD,  ITCS  International  Trade  by  Commodities 
Statistics, Rev. 3, Vol. 2007 Release 1. 
export price inflation  OECD, Economic Outlook Database. 
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II. Estimation tables for OECD (instead of AMECO) data of structural unemployment 
 
Table I - Regression results: impacts of private market adjustment and structural 
unemployment (OECD data) on competitiveness 
dependent variable:   bilateral trade balance
# A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6
market    (-1)*nominal compensation rate 0.342**
adjustment (0.171)
  (-1)*unit labour costs 0.001
(0.005)
  productivity 0.011**
(0.005)
  labour capital substitution 0.016
(0.011)
  FDI -0.002
(0.003)
  RCA -0.000
(0.001)
structural   (-1)*structural unemployment 0.035** 0.034* 0.036** 0.040** 0.061** 0.039*
reforms (OECD data) (0.017) (0.019 (0.017) (0.016) (0.029) (0.020)
macro   trade balance -0.209*** -0.198** -0.197*** -0.187*** -0.204*** -0.260***
variables (t-1) (0.067) (0.083) (0.066) (0.070) (0.071) (0.060)
trade balance 0.027 0.025 0.023 0.019 0.015 0.065***
(t-1) (0.018) (0.018) (0.015) (0.015) (0.026) (0.015)
  private consumption -0.007** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.013***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
  export prices 0.006** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.009** 0.005*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
EMU dummy -0.016 -0.023* -0.014 -0.025* -0.032** -0.010
(0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014) (0.015) (0.009)
constant 0.008 0.015 0.009 0.015 0.021 0.008
(0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.010) (0.013) (0.008)
model  N 1643 1720 1720 1720 1396 1502
specification instruments 38 26 40 26 27 26
AR (2) 0.522 0.579 0.577 0.630 0.184 0.291
Hansen (p-value) 0.125 0.169 0.387 0.253 0.179 0.354
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Table II - Regression results: impacts of private market adjustment and structural 
unemployment (OECD data) on competitiveness including an interaction term between 
structural unemployment (OECD data) and private market adjustment 
dependent variable:   bilateral trade balance
# A7 A8 A9 A10 A11 A12
market    (-1)*nominal compensation rate 0.354
adjustment (0.275)
  (-1)*unit labour costs 0.001
(0.005)
  productivity 0.010**
(0.005)
  labour capital substitution -0.015
(0.012)
  FDI -0.003
(0.003)
  RCA -0.001
(0.001)
structural   (-1)*structural unemployment 0.016 0.029 0.044** 0.037* 0.055 0.043**
reforms (OECD data) (0.020) (0.029) (0.019) (0.021) (0.034) (0.022)
interaction term -1.037* -0.020* 0.004 -0.033** 0.029* 0.000
(market adjustment*structural reforms) (0.551) (0.012) (0.008) (0.017) (0.015) (0.002)
macro   trade balance -0.202*** -0.180** -0.199*** -0.183*** -0.209*** 0.259***
variables (t-1) (0.065) (0.078) (0.063) (0.069) (0.069) (0.060)
trade balance 0.024 0.024 0.023* 0.021 0.016 0.065***
(t-1) (0.016) (0.018) (0.013) (0.015) (0.026) (0.016)
  private consumption -0.008** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.013***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
  export prices 0.006** 0.008** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.009** 0.005*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
EMU dummy -0.019 -0.028** -0.017 -0.018 -0.051*** -0.013
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.017) (0.010)
constant 0.012 0.017 0.009 0.007 0.026** 0.008
(0.009) (0.010) (0.006) (0.009) (0.012) (0.008)
model  N 1643 1720 1720 1720 1396 1502
specification instruments 32 30 48 30 32 30
AR (2) 0.535 0.696 0.554 0.667 0.133 0.301
Hansen (p-value) 0.182 0.368 0.583 0.262 0.294 0.407
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance of 10%, 5% and 1%.    
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Table III - Regression results: impacts of private market adjustment and structural unemployment (OECD data) on competitiveness including an 
interaction term between structural unemployment (OECD data) or private market adjustment and the EMU dummy 
dependent variable:   bilateral trade balance
# A13 A14 A15 A16 A17 A18 A19 A20 A21 A22 A23 A24
market    (-1)*nominal compensation rate 0.393* 0.406*
adjustment (0.230) (0.221)
  (-1)*unit labour costs -0.000 0.002
(0.004) (0.003)
  productivity 0.003 0.006
(0.005) (0.005)
  labour capital substitution -0.007 -0.028
(0.012) (0.022)
  FDI 0.000 0.012*
(0.002) (0.006)
  RCA 0.000 0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
structural   (-1)*structural unemployment 0.033* 0.046** 0.036*** 0.046*** 0.055* 0.033** 0.032** 0.025* 0.041** 0.038** 0.016 0.042*
reforms (OECD data) (0.018) (0.018) (0.013) (0.015) (0.031) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.018) (0.018) (0.037) (0.025)
interaction term -0.137 -0.004 0.010 0.043 -0.011* -0.004***
(markte adjustment*EMU dummy) (0.567) (0.006) (0.008) (0.032) (0.006) (0.001)
interaction term -0.048 -0.080** -0.055* -0.074** -0.035 -0.055*
(structural reforms*EMU dummy) (0.036) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.046) (0.031)
macro   trade balance -0.197*** -0.187** -0.171** -0.165** -0.194*** -0.256*** -0.206*** -0.202** -0.203*** -0.183** -0.178*** -0.253***
variables (t-1) (0.072) (0.082) (0.075) (0.067) (0.071) (0.063) (0.069) (0.086) (0.067) (0.074) (0.064) (0.066)
trade balance 0.023 0.021 0.021 0.015 0.008 0.059*** 0.029* 0.023 0.023 0.017 0.004 0.058***
(t-1) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.027) (0.017) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.036) (0.016)
  private consumption -0.008** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.008** -0.011*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.012***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
  export prices 0.006** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.006* 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.008** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.008**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
EMU dummy -0.013 -0.022** -0.011 -0.020 -0.028** -0.015 -0.014 -0.021* -0.014 -0.027* -0.018 -0.020*
(0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.013) (0.014) (0.010) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.011)
constant 0.004 0.015* 0.008 0.013 0.020 0.011 0.003 0.012 0.012* 0.019* 0.011 0.011
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.008) (0.007 (0.009) (0.007) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008)
model  N 1643 1720 1720 1720 1396 1502 1643 1720 1720 1720 1396 1502
specification instruments 37 33 30 30 31 30 39 33 48 32 29 30
AR (2) 0.614 0.672 0.749 0.790 0.197 0.335 0.556 0.587 0.552 0.689 0.219 0.354
Hansen (p-value) 0.128 0.427 0.747 0.541 0.199 0.299 0.265 0.327 0.258 0.176 0.311 0.156
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance of 10%, 5% and 1%.    